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Fox’s delayed decision to jump reflects his ‘first offence’
status – and perhaps Cameron’s anxiety not to deplete the
Cabinet’s ‘talent pool’
Scandals leading to Cabinet ministers’ resignation always involve a myriad of different causes
and circumstances. The Fox-Werritty case adds some new and bizarre elements to this
lexicon of mostly self-inflicted follies. Yet behind the apparent diversity lie some repeating
patterns that show up clearly in the sophisticated statistical analyses of modern political
science, as Torun Dewan explains. PMs often delay pushing out a minister while it is unclear
that the controversy has begun damaging government popularity in the opinion polls and its
longer run reputation. Once polling damage becomes evident, however – as it tends to do if a
media ‘wolf hunt’ is sustained into a second week – then ministers are culled, or are allowed
to resign ‘of their own accord’. Normally also this process works –and government popularity
returns to the status quo ante. Premiers also delay because the ‘talent pool’ available to staff the Cabinet
can become depleted.
Ministerial resignations take place for many different reasons, but they follow common ‘event history’
patterns that have been thoroughly explored and assessed in political science research. Liam Fox’s decision
to quit can be analysed in numerous different ways, in which we try to ascertain and weigh in the balance a
detailed explanation of why he jumped – for instance, the exact reasons why Whitehall sources could brief
Friday’s Financial Times that: ‘This is definitely a resignation issue’.
Yet ministerial resignations also have many recurring features, following ‘event history’ patterns that vary
greatly in their empirical details but none the less have many fundamental similarities.  A research team LSE
gathered data on such resignation issues across the whole post-war period up to 2007. We defined
resignation controversies as any issue over which there has been a serious call for the minister to resign. In
statistical analyses we explored the effect of scandals on actual resignations, while carefully controlling
statistically for the personal attributes of ministers and the characteristics of the governments in which they
serve.
This research provides some clear answers to some common questions. For a start, is it better for the
government that a minister tainted by a scandal resigns? Or does it do a Prime Minister and a government
more damage to acknowledge that a scandal has force, and that opposition or media criticisms of a Cabinet
minister were justified? In terms of the opinion polls the evidence is unambiguous: although scandals hurt
governments in the short term, these adverse effects are mitigated if the minister goes.
Yet does this mean that David Cameron is
clearly better off now that the government is rid
of Fox? Perhaps not. One question is why have
these stories arisen? Fox has been a divisive
figure at the Ministry of Defence. He has been
willing to challenge the status quo in many areas
where entrenched defence and armed forces
interests do not want to see reform. Some might
see Fox’s  treatment as a smear campaign that
can be traced back to his radicalism. And if so,
the lessons drawn by other ministers may be to
keep their heads down and to not risk being
similarly abrasive in their departments. So if
Cameron wants his ministers to be bold in
tackling their ministerial briefs, he may have to
offer them some protection when scandals arise.
This is amongst several sound reasons why
Prime Ministers often think twice before giving in
to the temptation to be rid of scandalised
ministers. These longer-run, strategic
considerations may also help to explain
Cameron’s delays in making a decision on Fox – rather than the special weaknesses of Number 10 influence
within the Coalition detected by Patrick Dunleavy in his recent blog; or the need to balance Tory party
factions, widely cited in the media.
Our research also generated insights into the chances of survival for Cabinet ministers who become
implicated in a scandal. One reason why Fox hung on and hung on for so long was the fact that is his first
scandal. The British data on resignations differs significantly from the rules of baseball – by following a `’two-
strikes and you’re out’ rule. Cabinet ministers have a good chance of surviving their first  case of becoming
embroiled in a potential resignation issue. But few top politicians can survive a second such.
A factor that worked against Fox, however, was that his scandal came relatively early in the coalition
government’s term of office.  This means that David Cameron still had a range of talented alternatives
available to replace Fox at the top of one of Whitehall’s largest and hardest-to-run departments. As time
goes on, however, the talent pool of available potential ministers tends to become depleted. And so over
time it becomes harder for the PM to replace a competent senior minister, strengthening their incentive to
defend their endangered colleagues for fear of ending up with someone worse as minister.
For more analysis on ministerial turnover and reshuffles please see Torun Dewan’s website.
His book Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in British Government 1945–2007 (joint with Keith
Dowding and Samuel Berlinski) will be published shortly by Cambridge University Press.
